UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE

COMMISSION,

. Case No. 18-cv-09284Plaintiff,

. Newark, New Jersey VS.

. March 4, 2019

PARMJIT PARMAR, et al.,

Defendants.

TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING BEFORE THE HONORABLE MICHAEL A. HAMMER UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

APPEARANCES:

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United States:

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Also present: Leslie Lehnert (Department of Justice), and

Katherine Murphy, (U.S. Attorney's

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1 (Commencement of proceedings at 11:24 A.M.) 2 THE COURT: All right. We are on the record in the 3 4 United States Securities and Exchange Commission versus 5 Parmjit Parmar, et al., Civil No. 18-9284. We're here for 6 oral argument on the Government's motion to stay the civil 7 case pending adjudication of the criminal charges. 8 criminal charges are -- well, let's start with appearances of 9 counsel, please, beginning with the plaintiff. 10 MR. ENRIGHT: Good morning, Your Honor. 11 Enright on behalf of the Securities and Exchange Commission. 12 THE COURT: All right. And for the defense? 13 MR. PARLATORE: Good morning, Your Honor. Tim Parlatore on behalf of Mr. Parmar. 14 15 THE COURT: All right. 16 MR. GRIPPO: Good morning, Your Honor. 17 Grippo, United States attorney on behalf of the United 18 States, the intervenor -- or proposed intervenor here. With 19 me at counsel table is Leslie Lehnert from the Money 20 Laundering and Asset Discovery Section of the Department of 21 Justice, and Katherine Murphy, who's an AUSA at the U.S. 22 Attorney's Office. Ms. Murphy and Ms. Lehnert are counsel of 23 record in the parallel criminal case. They have not yet 24 entered an appearance in this case, but they're appearing 25 with me on behalf of the Government.

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THE COURT:
                     All right. So the first item of
business is the Government's motion to intervene.
                                                   I did not
understand the defense to be opposing the intervention motion
as much as the stay motion.
          Is that correct?
         MR. PARLATORE: Correct, Judge. Really to narrow
it even further, it's more just the timing of when the stay
will go into effect.
                     No, I understand.
          THE COURT:
                                        We're going to get
to that.
         We're going to cover that.
         MR. PARLATORE:
                        So -- ves.
          THE COURT:
                     Let me just get on the -- deal with the
intervention first.
          I also agree that under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24, that
the Government -- the Government's motion to intervene should
be granted. Under Rule 24(a)(2), a potential intervenor has
four criteria that they must satisfy: One, the application
to intervene must be timely; two, there must be a sufficient
interest by the intervenor in the litigation; three, that
interest must be subject to being impaired or affected by
disposition of the matter sub judice; and, four, the
interests of the intervening party are not adequately
protected by the present litigants. See United States v.
Territories of the Virgin Islands, 748 F.3d 514 at 519 (3d
Cir. 2014).
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1 In this case, the Court is satisfied, one, that the 2 application to intervene is timely; second, that the Government does have a sufficient interest which could be 3 4 impaired or affected by the current civil litigation -- of 5 course, I make that observation -- or that conclusion on the 6 motion to intervene, not on the stay issue, which we'll 7 address in a motion. It is at least -- it's possible that 8 the -- the Government obviously has an interest and the 9 public has an interest in the effective investigation and enforcement of federal law, which could be impaired or 10 11 affected as a practical matter by disposition of the civil 12 case. Moreover, the Court accepts the Government's 13 representation that the present litigants are not capable of 14 adequately representing the Government's interests in the 15 criminal case insofar as the SEC is a civil litigant in this 16 matter. 17 So for those reasons and given the fact that the 18 defense does not object to the motion to intervene, that 19 application is granted. 20 We can now turn to the stay. At this point, who's 21 going to be arguing the stay issue for the Government? 22 MR. GRIPPO: Your Honor, I will be. 23 THE COURT: Mr. Grippo? 24 MR. GRIPPO: Yes. THE COURT: Okay. So let's tee up first sort of

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where we are and exactly what is at issue. And this is
something, I think, that Mr. Parlatore touched on briefly
before.
          So the civil case has been filed, and it's pending.
Nothing other than this motion and the -- a motion to dismiss
filed by Mr. Parmar has been filed. There's been no
discovery. And, importantly, I think, because this certainly
factors into the defendant's argument, there's no -- the
defense does not oppose the motion to stay, because the
defense is seeking discovery. If I understand correctly, the
sole issue is whether to stay the case entirely or whether to
allow the case to proceed for the relatively narrow purpose
of allowing the defense to proceed with the motion to
dismiss.
          There are criminal charges that are pending against
Mr. Parmar; also the co-defendants. They were filed in May
2018. And I don't -- I did not get the sense from the
parties' papers that there's much dispute about the
similarity of factual issues or factual allegations, at
least -- and to some extent, perhaps, legal issues between
the criminal complaint and the civil matter.
          MR. PARLATORE: I agree with everything you just
said there.
          THE COURT:
                     Right. And since it's the Government's
motion -- and obvious I'll be hearing from Mr. Parlatore in a
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1 moment. 2 Mr. Grippo, given that all the defense wants to do is be heard on the motion to dismiss and 3 4 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a motion to dismiss by definition 5 tests only the sufficiency of the pleadings -- I also know 6 there's a 9(b) component to that. But all, really, 7 Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) is the enheightened -- or is the 8 heightened pleading standard. So we have Fed. R. Civ. P. 8, 9 which generally governs pleadings and the sufficiency of 10 pleadings before the Court except when it comes to fraud, 11 which, of course, is governed by the particularity 12 requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). 13 If all the defense is arguing is, Judge, we should 14 be allowed to proceed with this case for the limited purpose 15 of being heard on whether the complaint, in its pled -- in 16 its current pleading form states a viable -- a recognizable 17 cause of action and that we, the defendants, are not seeking 18 any discovery in this case, nor will the motion trigger the 19 need for discovery, why should I grant the stay? Much of the 20 briefing, at least on the Government's side, talks about the 21 Walsh factors, one, where the court really there limited its 22 analysis to -- or there was concern solely with 23 interrogatories and depositions. 24 That's not at issue here. 25 So how will the motion to dismiss, limited as it is

to the sufficiency of the pleadings, imperil the Government's 1 criminal investigation? 2 3 MR. GRIPPO: Thank you, Your Honor. 4 Your Honor, before answering that question, just 5 one additional update. The Court laid out the factual and 6 procedural background. 7 The case has now indicted Mr. Parmar and the 8 defendants on a criminal complaint and one additional 9 defendant, Pavandeep Bakhshi, were indicted by a grand jury 10 in December. 11 THE COURT: Okay. 12 MR. GRIPPO: So that is an update on the procedural 13 status. 14 And that favors the stay motion. 15 But focusing on the Court's question --16 THE COURT: Well, it does and it doesn't, though. 17 I mean, to the extent -- again, it's important to 18 sort of segregate out what would happen if I deny the stay, 19 what won't happen if I deny the stay. 20 What would happen is -- well, what wouldn't happen 21 is there would be no discovery still. And so the Fifth 22 Amendment concerns that, for example, Judge Bassler talked 23 about in Walsh still wouldn't obtain, you know -- the 24 interesting thing is in <u>Walsh</u>, it was the defense that was 25 looking for the -- the individuals who were on the receiving

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    end of the criminal charges who were looking for the stay.
    It wasn't the Government. Right?
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              MR. GRIPPO: Yes, Your Honor.
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              THE COURT: And their concerns there were,
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    essentially, if we're required to go forward, you're going
    to -- you, Judge, are going put us in this tenuous position
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    that (A) in answering interrogatories, we may have a dispute
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    over Fifth Amendment privilege issues, and, in fact, Judge
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   Bassler noted in an aside, even during the oral argument, it
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   became evident to the court that there were going to be
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   privilege disputes that the court would then have to rule on;
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    certainly in depositions.
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              But I still don't -- even though the case is now
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    indicted, the criminal case is, I'm still not sure that I see
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   how -- certainly, it doesn't give rise to the defendant's
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    Fifth Amendment concerns, and, if so, they want to proceed.
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              How does it imperil the Government's criminal
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    investigation?
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              MR. GRIPPO: Your Honor, let me answer that
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    question, because we are here on one very narrow issue.
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   motion to dismiss is not a typical motion to dismiss that the
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    Court has likely seen and become familiar with in the context
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   of Rule 12(b)(6).
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              This is a highly intensive, fact-intensive
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   motion --
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1 THE COURT: Sorry. I'm not trying to block you as 2 much as just pull up --3 MR. GRIPPO: Understood, Your Honor. Understood. 4 THE COURT: -- the motion. 5 Go ahead. 6 MR. GRIPPO: The motion to dismiss is a 7 fact-intensive -- is a fact-intensive response by the 8 defendant that includes a number of wide-ranging allegations 9 and theories we believe are at the heart of the defendant's 10 defenses in the criminal case. And although the SEC can 11 reply on its pleadings in responding, the SEC may also feel 12 compelled to respond to some of the very fact-intensive and, 13 in our view, completely meritless allegations of the 14 defendant. But they are the same allegations that we are --15 have heard and will likely face in the criminal case. 16 And we think there are two compelling reasons to 17 deny -- or to grant -- excuse me -- the Government's motion. 18 One is, as a matter of public policy, courts favor the 19 criminal proceeding over the civil proceeding when there are 20 competing interests. And we believe there are competing 21 interests here, because allowing the SEC's pleading to be 22 litigated in the manner in which the defendant has presented it, will involve, we believe, at least some fact-intensive 23 24 litigation. 25 And, Your Honor, we think that allowing the

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is also signed by Judge Arleo?

criminal case to proceed first would resolve many, if not all of the issues that are pending in the SEC case. But also, Your Honor, as a matter of judicial efficiency and efficiency for the parties, it makes little sense to us to have a court spent the time reviewing the SEC complaint and reviewing Mr. Parmar's allegations and responses, when all of those issues are going to be first decided in the criminal case before a jury or even before the Court. So as just a matter of efficiency and preserving the resources of the Court and the parties, we believe a stay is in everyone's interest. And last, Your Honor, we cannot think of a form of prejudice to the defendant -- and Mr. Parlatore has not offered any argument on prejudice -- to allowing the criminal case to proceed first and freezing the SEC case in its current status. Nothing else will happen. The complaint will remain pending. And there's just no harm to Mr. Parmar, who is indicted now and will be focusing -- and rightly so -on a criminal case which is active and is currently pending before Judge Arleo. We do not have a trial date in that case, Your Honor --THE COURT: I'm sorry. Did you say the indictment

1 MR. GRIPPO: Yes. 2 Okay. Let me ask you this. THE COURT: 3 the relationship between the many exhibits filed by the 4 defense as part of their motion, which isn't really a motion 5 to dismiss at all; it's more like a Rule 12(c) except for the 6 fact that there's been no answer filed. 7 What is the relationship between those documents 8 and the allegations in the complaint? Because on the one 9 hand, you're right, the -- it's not a typical motion to 10 dismiss in the sense that it's a legal argument that 11 basically argues that the pleadings in the complaint, even 12 taken as true, nonetheless are insufficient to state a 13 viable -- or cognizable cause of action and where, as here, 14 the Court is also then being called upon -- or possibly being 15 called upon to interpret and apply numerous documents, some 16 of which are north of a hundred pages in length, goes beyond 17 the parameters of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. 18 On the other hand, under Rule 12(c), the Court may 19 consider matters outside the pleadings to the extent the 20 pleadings incorporate them. 21 So what are -- what is the relationship between 22 these many exhibits and the pending motion -- or the 23 allegations in the complaint? 24 MR. GRIPPO: Your Honor, it's our understanding 25 that the exhibits support or purport to support the

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defendant's arguments that there's no fraud here. exhibits, according to the defendant, exonerate him on the underlying civil fraud claims and the criminal claims. And although the Court can confine its analysis to the pleadings, that is not what Mr. Parmar is asking the Court to do. He's launching into the merits of the underlying allegations. Those allegations overlap almost completely with the allegations in the indictment. And he's asking -- or at least attempting to get into the merits of the underlying claims. And that is what we're concerned about only because as a matter of efficiency and process, we believe that those claims and those arguments should be heard in the criminal case. Mr. Parmar is certainly entitled to put on a defense. But we're not attempting to limit that in any way in the criminal case. This is solely a matter of process and prioritizing the active indicted criminal case over the civil litigation. THE COURT: So let me ask you this. I'm sure you've had an opportunity to consider the -- to closely study the defendant's motion to dismiss. How, in your best estimate, would you see that playing out terms litigating that motion? Would the parties be limited to -- or would some -- any discovery be required

in order to argue the veracity or not of the defendant's

arguments to the extent they rely on the exhibits?

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              MR. GRIPPO: Your Honor, I don't -- I do not want
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    to speak on behalf of the SEC, who would be litigating that
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   motion.
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              But I certainly could envision the SEC feeling
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   compelled to respond to some of the fact-sensitive
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    allegations. Whether that leads to some limited discovery, I
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    don't -- I'm not in a position to say --
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              THE COURT:
                          Okay.
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              MR. GRIPPO: -- because the SEC may --
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              THE COURT:
                         Okay. Let me put that to the SEC.
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                            Judge, sitting here today, I don't
              MR. ENRIGHT:
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   believe we would need discovery to adequately oppose the
    defendant's motion to dismiss.
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              THE COURT: Okay. So -- because there are very
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    substantial exhibits. Are these all exhibits that were
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    incorporated into the Government's complaint? Or are you
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    arguing that the Court itself would need to consider those
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    exhibits in considering the motion to dismiss?
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              MR. ENRIGHT: The latter, Your Honor.
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              THE COURT: Okay. All right. Thank you.
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    appreciate that.
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              Anything else from you, Mr. Grippo? I mean, I'll
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    give you an opportunity to respond after Mr. Parlatore's
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    argued.
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              MR. GRIPPO: I think that's it, Your Honor.
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1 just reserve the opportunity to respond --2 THE COURT: All right. MR. GRIPPO: -- as Your Honor noted. 3 But thank 4 you. 5 THE COURT: All right. 6 So, Mr. Parlatore, I have to -- I have to admit, I 7 do agree with Mr. Grippo that this is far from your ordinary 8 Rule 12(b)(6). You've -- you're asking the Court to consider 9 hundreds of pages of documents and exhibits that include a number of emails, prior motions, documents that were 10 11 purportedly exchanged, you know, during the efforts by the --12 or during the alleged efforts by the defendants to have the 13 private investment firm provide funding and representations that were made to them during that period. 14 15 Why does it make sense for the Court to delve into 16 all of these matters that go beyond just the four corners of 17 the complaint, given the case has been charged, it's actually 18 now indicted, as opposed to waiting until after the criminal 19 case has run its course. MR. PARLATORE: Your Honor, our position is that 20 21 all of the exhibits there are part of the due diligence 22 materials, which were incorporated by reference into the 23 The underlying facts of this case relate to a 24 publicly traded company that was taken private. And the 25 allegation is that the value was inflated and false

information was provided.

And while the complaint relies upon all the due diligence materials incorporating those, they then selectively quote from just a couple of spreadsheets and models from very early on without considering the totality of all of the true data that was supplied.

So, therefore, my client's position is that under 12(b)(6) that -- that when you consider all of the documents that are referenced and incorporated by reference in the complaint, that it's insufficient. You know, the -- what they're saying can't be.

Now, we filed that motion, you know, within the required period of time, and we -- Mr. Parmar does not want to have all of these cases hanging out there. There was no need for the SEC to file this case but for the -- of course the joint press release at the beginning of the case. The fact that they wanted to put this out at the beginning as well as a related in rem civil forfeiture proceeding, they put all these out there at the same time. Mr. Parmar has the right to defend himself in all three of these cases. The SEC's civil complaint and the in rem civil forfeiture complaint, motions to dismiss have been filed in both of those cases.

One thing that I would like to address related to the fact that the case has now been indicted, that actually

goes against the Government's application here because when initially this motion was made, there was discussion about if due diligence materials were -- that were incorporated by reference are put into the motion to dismiss, the SEC may want to respond with additional due diligence materials, which wouldn't be subject to discovery yet, as it was unindicted.

At this point, Mr. Parmar's been indicted. So any documents that the SEC would choose to put in their response saying this was also incorporated by reference into the complaint is something the Government should have already given us anyway. So there's -- there's no issues whatever about this case in any way impacting discovery or anything else in the criminal case.

The problem is -- and the reason why the -- this and the in rem civil forfeiture case should be litigated at this point is that we have two civil complaints and a criminal indictment that allege wrongdoing against Mr. Parmar that's just not supported. So he does have the absolute right to move to dismiss these at this time.

One thing that Your Honor should be aware of is that the related in rem civil forfeiture case where they did file special interrogatories and there has been discussion over whether that should stay the motion to dismiss, we just had a conference call with Magistrate Wettre last week to try

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incorporated by reference.

figure out that issue. I've been talking with AUSA Sarah Devlin in the interim. I -- I'm hopeful that we've figured out that issue. And Magistrate Aster at that time, if you guys figure out the special interrogatory issue, does the Government intend to respond to the motion to dismiss? which raises substantially identical issues to this one here, and AUSA Devlin said yes. So they have no problem responding to a substantially identical motion to dismiss in that case. here they're saying that they would be, you know, somehow prejudiced when the reality is this complaint, when considering what the due diligence materials that they referenced, is completely insufficient. I recognize that the volume of exhibits is significant. This is a case that the due diligence process, went from, I think, April through January. So it was a very long period of time. The -- the entity that was then identified as the victim in this, which, I guess, they're not the victim anymore, due to the corporate victim disclosure, they spent over \$7 million on the due diligence process. So, yes, this is a case where due diligence materials is a substantial amount of documentation. But those are the documents that they cited. Those are the documents that they

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And in the complaint, when trying to lay out with specificity what they're required to prove, instead of going with the actual financial documents that were provided much later in the due diligence, they instead took a couple of selective quotes from models that were provided very early in the complaint. The concern that I have -- frankly, if THE COURT: it were just a straightforward motion to dismiss that relied solely on the four corners of the SEC's complaint, I don't think it would be much of a difficult decision at all in terms of denying the motion to stay. I am not even sure at that point the Government would be opposing the motion. But you're asking the Court here, essentially -aren't you basically asking the Court with your -- as I read your opposition -- to essentially make a decision now that -in light of those materials, make a decision that requires the Court to ascertain fraudulent intent and issues such as materiality? And I don't know how the Court is possibly in a position to do, particularly on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. MR. PARLATORE: I disagree with that, Judge. think --THE COURT: Moreover -- let me just give you -just to complete the thought. Under Rule 12(d), to the extent that the Court considers matters outside the pleadings, the Court then has

to convert the motion -- the Court's faced with a choice 1 2 Either exclude those exhibits or convert the motion to a summary judgment. And if it's the latter, doesn't that run 3 4 the risk, as the Government had said, of inconsistent 5 judgments? MR. PARLATORE: If the Court did that. 6 7 However, our motion to dismiss was very narrowly 8 tailored to just incorporated documents that were 9 incorporated by reference in the complaint. 10 So we would oppose --11 THE COURT: But here's my concern --12 (Simultaneous conversation) 13 MR. PARLATORE: -- our position is that that 14 wouldn't --15 (Simultaneous conversation) 16 THE COURT: Here's my concern. You want the Court, 17 though, to read those and then essentially evaluate whether 18 there was fraud, whether there was fraudulent intent. 19 mean, otherwise, I don't know why -- your argument 20 essentially is -- it's almost a rule of completeness 21 argument, isn't it? It's a -- when the Government -- when 22 the Government pled X in the complaint and referenced, for 23 example, you know, this particular email, then we told you 24 part of the story. And so, Judge, you should read the rest 25 of the email and make the decision that that "rest of the

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story" part that the Government didn't quote in the complaint thereby shows there was no fraudulent intent. And I don't know how the Court possibly does that on a motion to dismiss. That's not the purpose of a motion to dismiss at all. MR. PARLATORE: If I may, Your Honor. THE COURT: Yeah. MR. PARLATORE: I think that may be -- as much as my client may like the Court to delve into all those merits at this point, I think that the standard of a motion to dismiss is at -- lower than that where we've got a situation where the due diligence materials shows that there wasn't any fraud. But in a motion to dismiss, every possible inference goes to the plaintiff's favor. So if they have something, anything that they can show in opposition that actually supports their theory, that actually supports that there was a fraud, it's not that difficult -- it shouldn't be that difficult of a motion to defeat.

THE COURT: No, but it wouldn't -- they wouldn't be allowed to present that in the motion. They wouldn't be able to incorporate new material. At that point, then, the pleading, which is supposed to be the very measure of the motion -- or the sufficiency of the pleading was supposed to be the very measure of the motion, ends up becoming almost beside the point, and it's a moving target as to what the

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parties are now purporting to supplement the record with.
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    That's exactly the opposite of a motion to dismiss.
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              MR. PARLATORE: Your Honor, I -- respectfully, I
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    disagree. I think --
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              THE COURT: You're free to do that. Everybody's
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    free to do that.
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              MR. PARLATORE: I think that when -- when they put
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    into the complaint due diligence materials, if they can
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    identify what -- what they incorporated by reference there
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    that supports their theory, it's not -- I think that the way
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    that this is being characterized is a much more intensive
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    analysis than is necessary at a 12(b)(6) stage.
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              THE COURT:
                         Wait. I don't think so, though,
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   Mr. Parlatore given that you're the one that submitted -- I'm
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    going to conservatively say north of 300 pages of exhibits to
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    your Rule 12(b)(6) motion.
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              MR. PARLATORE: Yes.
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              THE COURT:
                         How is it -- I mean, I assume you want
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    the Court to review these, to scrutinize those carefully
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    along the lines of, Judge, the Government hasn't told you the
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    entire story.
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              And I understand that.
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              My only point is I have some real concerns over
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   whether a Rule 12(b)(6) motion -- and you -- that's fair
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   advocacy. But I have real concerns over whether a
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Rule 12(b)(6) motion in any event would be the proper vehicle to do that, but particularly where, as here, there is a parallel criminal case. MR. PARLATORE: And my position there, Judge, is that they chose to file this -- to file this suit contemporaneous with the criminal case. They also chose to file an in rem civil forfeiture complaint, which they've already -- which they've stated to the magistrate that they are agreeing to oppose -- file an opposition to the motion to dismiss. So if they didn't want to litigate the basic sufficiency of their pleading until after the criminal case, why do they file it before the criminal -- at the inception This is a decision that they made. of the criminal case? And at this point, Mr. Parmar has the right to challenge the sufficiency of the pleadings against him, and he opposes the Government's desire to let these insufficient pleadings just hang out there for as long as it takes until the criminal case is resolved. Okay. All right. THE COURT: Mr. Grippo, do you want to respond? MR. GRIPPO: Just very briefly, Your Honor. motion to dismiss in this case, Your Honor, does not simply challenge the sufficiency of the pleadings or test the due diligence materials that are referenced in the complaint. Ιt

1 goes on to spin a counternarrative that includes the 2 principal victim of the case being the actual fraudster in 3 the case. And Mr. -- Mr. Parmar is alleging not only that 4 the victim was not deceived, but that he actually knew about 5 the fraud and was the mastermind of it, and then engaged in 6 fraudulent bankruptcy. And that's laid out in detail in the 7 paper. 8 I read it. THE COURT: Yup. 9 MR. GRIPPO: And certainly there's nothing about 10 that in the SEC's complaint. That's completely outside of 11 the four corners. 12 And, Your Honor, I would just note one other thing. 13 I know it's a different proceeding that the Court observed 14 that, given the amount of information Mr. Parmar has injected 15 into this motion record, that one course of action could be 16 converting the motion to a summary judgment motion. 17 actually happened in a related bankruptcy proceeding --18 THE COURT: Right. 19 MR. GRIPPO: -- the adversary proceeding. that case, Mr. Parmar made similar allegations in a 20 21 cross-claim, and there was a motion to dismiss the 22 cross-claim, and it panned out in a way that the court 23 eventually converted it to a summary judgment motion, and 24 Mr. Parmar withdrew or filed a motion to withdraw those 25 claims without prejudice based on his Fifth Amendment

privilege, because it heated up to a point where it was in a summary judgment posture. And this motion presents the same, you know, fact-sensitive issues. And, you know, we think this would be heading in a similar direction if the Court didn't stay it now.

THE COURT: All right.

I have carefully considered the parties' arguments, both in their briefing and today. I have also very carefully reviewed the pending motion to dismiss the criminal case and the complaint filed in this matter.

As I noted, this case certainly is different than the <u>Walsh</u> matter. In <u>Walsh</u> it was the defendants and not the Government who made the motion to stay the civil case, essentially arguing that requiring them to go forward and engage in discovery would be tantamount to make the -- force them to make the Hobbsian choice between their Fifth Amendment privilege and engaging in civil discovery to defend themselves in the matter. The court identified a number of areas in the civil discovery where -- that would pose particularly acute problems for both the defendants -- and for that matter, the Court -- in terms of navigating those privilege issues. So this case is different.

But nonetheless the factors that the <u>Walsh</u> court articulated have come to be well accepted as nonexclusive guiding posts for courts to consider in determining whether

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to stay pending civil litigation because of a pending criminal matter. And, as the Government notes, this case has now been indicted. Those factors, of course, include the extent to which the issues in the criminal and civil case overlap. this case, I think all parties agree, and I conclude that there is very substantial overlap. Both cases essentially allege fraud both in terms of securities fraud and conspiracy to commit wire fraud in the manner in which Mr. Parmar and his co-defendants engaged in a variety of methods to essentially give the appearance that their company was capitalized and more profitable and had higher earnings beyond that which was true in order to be able to engage in the deal with the private investment firm. And the manner in which they are alleged to have done so substantially overlaps between the criminal complaint and the civil complaint here. In terms of the second Walsh factor, the status of the case, including whether the defendants have been indicted, in this case, the Government represents now -- and I have no reason to doubt them -- that the matter has been indicted. Accordingly, the first two factors do favor a stay.

The third is the interests of, in this case, the defendant as the party opposing the stay in proceeding expeditiously weighed against the prejudice to -- caused by

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any delay. I think this factor certainly does not favor Mr. Parmar. I do understand his argument that he would like to undergo at least a motion to dismiss in the civil case. But I can't identify any specific prejudice that he would suffer if that motion were to be delayed. He would certainly still have the opportunity, after the criminal case, to make that very same argument. This isn't a situation where he risks losing in the event of a stay evidence to spoliation or fading memories, because there's no party in this case who is seeking to -- or opposing the stay based on the collection of discovery or taking of discovery. It's limited to the motion to dismiss, a motion that could be made certainly at the conclusion of the criminal case. The private interests and burden on the parties doesn't particularly, as far as I can see, apply here. The interests of the Court -- this is particularly significant here. As I already established, I have real concerns over, frankly, the viability of the defendant's It includes -- it would be one thing, as I noted earlier, if it were truly a motion to dismiss in terms of taking the complaint at face value and the hallmark of any Rule 12(b)(6), assuming for purposes of the motion, the allegations set forth in the complaint are true. core of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion; and for that matter, a Rule 12(c) motion.

But that is not what the defense here proposes to do. The defense here proposes to do the opposite, and that is to point out that the allegations in the complaint are not true because the materials that the allegation -- or the allegations of the complaint rely on were selectively quoted by the -- by the SEC. In a sense, then, the motion seeks to challenge the accuracy or truthfulness of the assertions.

In that regard, I cannot find that the proposed motion really is an appropriate Rule 12(b)(6) -- or for that

motion really is an appropriate Rule 12(b)(6) -- or for that matter, Rule 12(c) -- motion at all. It's much closer to a Rule -- a summary judgment motion. And in that context, then, is considering matters outside of the pleadings. That in turn, if it were converted to a summary judgment motion -- and, of course, Judge Arleo would have the discretion to refuse to consider matters outside the pleadings or to refuse to consider the motion altogether in its current form.

But if the Court were to consider the motion and rule on it as summary judgment, as Mr. Grippo pointed out or the Government pointed out, that really would, then, risk the -- run the risk of inconsistent judgments in parallel cases where I've already characterized the allegations in both as substantially -- or the factual and legal issues as being substantially similar.

And for those reasons, I'm going to grant the Government's application to stay.

1 Look, frankly, Mr. Parlatore, if the defense wishes to come back and ask the Court to consider that for purposes of a motion that does not include hundreds of pages of 3 4 exhibits and establishes or takes the complaint at face 5 value, I'm happy to consider that at the appropriate time. 6 But based on the motion to dismiss, Docket Entry 12, that was 7 filed back in August, I cannot agree that the matter should 8 proceed in terms of -- even in the limited purpose of the 9 motion to dismiss. 10 So I'm going to grant the Government's application 11 to intervene and grant the Government's motion to stay 12 without prejudice to the defendant's right to be heard, if at 13 some point the defendant wishes to make a motion to dismiss that is narrowly tailored to truly considering the four 14 15 corners of the complaint. 16 Anything else for the Government at this time or the SEC? 17 18 MR. GRIPPO: No, Your Honor. Nothing further from 19 the Government. Thank you. MR. ENRIGHT: Nothing further from the SEC. 20 21 Mr. Parlatore, anything else for you, THE COURT: 22 sir? 23 MR. PARLATORE: Thank you, Judge. No. 24 THE COURT: All right. Thank you, everyone, we're 25 adjourned.

|Hearing |18-cv-09284, March 4, 2019

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